propter se. For being you is not being musical, since you are not by your very Glasgow Rangers nature musical. What, then, you are by your very nature is your essence.
Nor yet is the whole of this the essence DC United Dresy of a thing; not that which is propter se as white is to a surface, because being a surface is not identical with being white. But again the combination of both-’being a Mikkel Boedker Tröjor white surface’-is not the essence of surface, because ‘surface’ itself is added. The formula, therefore, in which the term itself is not present but its meaning Bayern Munich Femme is expressed, this is the formula of the essence of each thing. Therefore if to be a white surface is to be a smooth surface, to be white and to be smooth are Chelsea one and the same.
But since there are also compounds answering to the other categories (for there is a substratum for each category, e.g. for quality, quantity, time, place, and motion), we must inquire whether there is a formula of the essence of each of them, i.e. whether to these compounds also there belongs an essence, e.g. ‘white man’. Let the compound be denoted by ‘cloak’. What FC Dallashome Dresy is the essence of cloak? But, it may be said, this also is not a propter Phil Esposito Tröja se expression. We reply that there are just two ways in which a Maillot Benfica predicate may fail to be true of a subject propter se, and one of these results from the addition, and the other from the omission, of Guy Lafleur Tröja a determinant. One kind of predicate is not propter se because the term that is being defined is combined with Maillot Leicester City another determinant, e.g. if in defining the essence of white Atlas Dresy one were to state the formula of white man; the other because in the subject another determinant is combined with that which is expressed in the formula, e.g. if ‘cloak’ meant ‘white man’, and one were to define cloak as white; white man is white indeed, Maillot Isco but its essence is not to be white.
But is being-a-cloak an essence at all? Probably not. For the essence is precisely what something is; but when an attribute is asserted of a subject other than itself, the complex is not precisely what some ‘this’ is, e.g. white man is not precisely what some ‘this’ is, since thisness belongs only to substances. Therefore there is an essence only of those things whose formula is a definition. But we have a definition not where we have a word and a formula identical in meaning (for in that case all formulae or sets of words would be definitions; for there will be some name for any set of words whatever, so that even the Iliad will be a definition), but where there is a formula of something primary; and primary things are those which do not imply the predication of one element in them of another element. Nothing, then, which is not a species of a genus will have an essence-only species will have it, for these are thought to imply not merely that the subject participates in the attribute and has it as an affection, or has it by accident; but for ever thing else as well, if it has a name, there be a formula of its meaning-viz. that this attribute belongs to this subject; or instead of a simple formula we shallinks:
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